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Abstract: This study examines the influence of board characteristics and 
corporate performance on CEO turnover decisions using a sample of 144 firms 
from non-financial companies listed on the Nigerian Stock exchange between 
the periods of 2011 to 2015. The study adopts agency and resource 
dependency theories to support its objectives and applies a logistic regression 
statistical technique to analyse the results. The results show that board 
nominating committee has a significant positive relationship with CEO turnover 
and board gender diversity has a negative influence on CEO turnover. Also, 
the study also finds that poor corporate performance leads to CEO turnover. 
On the overall, the findings indicate that company performance, board 
nominating committee and gender diversity in the boardroom are 
consequential in the Nigerian corporate landscape. In line with the findings, 
this study suggests that the government should enact legislation on gender 
quota for more women appointment to the board of the corporation to better 
the performance of the firm, and as well to enhance the monitoring role of the 
board.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
It is a common knowledge that CEOs occupy the most strategic position in corporations. This 
position placed them in a vantage position to take corporate decisions and executive day to day 
business of the companies on behalf of the owners. CEO has the responsibility for putting in place 
organisational structure, strategy and performance. CEO occupies a central position in an 
organisation and plays a vital role in the performance of the corporation. Consequently, the CEOs 
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are often praised and rewarded when the companies are performing well. On the other hand, they 
are punished by way of dismissal or termination of their appointment. Hence, CEO turnover is a 
vital tool in the hands of the shareholders to compel the CEOs to act in the best interest of the 
owners of the companies.  
The threat of sack or dismissal also serves as a strong motivation to the CEOs to pursue the 
interest of the owners/shareholders, which is in line with the extant literature establishing a 
negative relationship between performance and CEO turnover (Conyon & He, 2014; Ishak & Latif, 
2012; Rokiah, 2010; Sanda, Mikailu, & Garba, 2010). However, in deciding to fire or change a 
CEO in the event of poor performance, corporate performance measurement are adopted. These 
measures comprise accounting-based and market-based performance (Fatima, Goergen, & Mira, 
2013; Lindrianasari & Hartono, 2012; Rachpradit, Tang, & Ba Khang, 2012; Ishak, 2010). 
Furthermore, board structure plays a vital role in the effective functioning of the companies and 
plays a critical role in corporate governance. Thus, with effective and proper corporate 
governance in place, the top management team of the firms are more likely to pursue the interest 
of the shareholders (Nguyen, Locke, & Reddy, 2014). 
Several corporate governance variables have been examined by prior researchers in the 
corporate governance literature on CEO succession; board structure and firm performance 
(Cheng, Hu, & Saffar, 2014; Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2012; Guo & Masulis, 2015). However, not 
much attention has been paid to the influence of board nominating committee on CEO turnover 
especially in developing economies with weak markets and regulatory system. Similarly, board 
gender diversity is currently attracting the attention of the researchers. However, no studies to the 
best of the researchers’ knowledge have examined the influence of board gender on the CEO 
turnover in the emerging markets. Although, most of the studies on board gender diversity were 
carried out in the developed economies, however, the empirical findings are mixed or 
inconclusive. Consequent upon this mixed empirical evidence, Nguyen et al., (2014) suggest that 
the differences in the research contexts and the econometric methods used are responsible for 
the mixed findings. 
Hence, this study examines the influence of corporate performance, board gender diversity 
and board nominating committee on CEO turnover in Nigerian PLCs. Furthermore, prior studies 
have concentrated on the common attributes of board structure such as board size, board 
composition and board committees. Limited studies have considered the influence of board 
nominating committee and board members’ gender. These variables have the potentiality to 
enhance the effectiveness of the board in discharging its monitoring of the management and 
disciplining them when necessary (Ku Ismail & Abdul Manaf, 2016; Ogbechie, 2012). As a result, 
this study considers the board members’ gender to influence the CEO turnover.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
This section discusses the review of relevant literature and development of the suitable 
hypothesis to investigate the influence of corporate performance and board structure on the CEO 
turnover. 
 
2.1  CEO Turnover 
 
CEO turnover is theoretically hinged on the agency theory which postulates that the shareholders 
(principal) use the turnover as a tool by which the CEOs are threatened with dismissal in the event 
of poor performance of the companies (Fama & Jensen, 1983). To mitigate the agency problem, 
Fama and Jensen (1983) recommended delegating the internal control to the board of directors 
to monitor the management decisions and corporate behaviour. They equally made suggestions 
of some specific board attributes that could enhance the effectiveness of the board in monitoring 
and ensuring that the managers act in the best interest of the shareholders. On the other side of 
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the coin, turnover serves as an incentive to the CEOs to implement proper strategies and manage 
the firms efficiently and effectively to increase the shareholders’ wealth and enhance the 
performance of the firms to avoid being fired by the shareholders (Dikolli, Mayew, & Nanda, 2014). 
As argued by Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin (1988), corporate performance affects CEO 
dismissal, but the relationship is not direct as it is mediated by social and political factors. The 
organisation’s desire to shift direction leads to dismissal of the CEO, and it is a major event 
generally initiated by the board of directors (Dikolli et al., 2014; Kind & Schläpfer, 2011 and 
Maharjan, 2015). Consequently, Fredrickson et al. (1988) came up with a dismissal model which 
postulated that, for a CEO to be either dismissed or retained, the board of directors draw a 
comparison between the firm’s current actual performance and the board’s performance 
expectation. Substantial empirical evidence abound with regard to the direct relationship between 
firm performance and the decision to dismiss or retain the CEO, however, further studies have 
equally established that the link is moderated by some socio-political constructs that strengthen 
this relationship, these constructs include; board structure and ownership structure (Cannella & 
Lubatkin, 1993; Ishak, Ku Ismail, & Abdullah, 2013; Rachpradit et al., 2012). 
 
2.2  Firm Performance and CEO Turnover 
 
The relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover had gained prominence because 
it has over time been used as a measure of the effectiveness of management of the firms 
(Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2012; Ishak, Ku Ismail & Abdullah, 2013 and Cook, 2015). It is argued 
that the negative association between firm performance and CEO turnover is a measure of 
effectiveness the corporate governance mechanisms of a firm as represented in the decision of 
the board of directors by removing the CEO in the event of poor performance. Several studies 
had concentrated on the relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance (Cook, 2015; 
Fiordelisi & Ricci, 2013). Although, most of the studies that were conducted established a negative 
relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover, however, there are remarkable 
divergent results across the countries. While the studies from the UK and the US report that 
current performance affects CEO turnover, most of the studies from the developing markets 
established that poor performance has a lagged effect on CEO turnover (Conyon & He, 2014; 
Ishak & Abdul Latif, 2012; Ishak, KU Ismail, & Abdullah, 2012).  
Similarly, Lindrianasari and Hartono (2012) examine the importance of accounting and 
market-based information in Indonesia, using samples of all the firms that experienced CEO 
turnover between 1998 and 2006, they find that when the accounting and market performance 
decrease, the probability that the CEO dismissal is higher and vice versa. In the same vein, 
Rachpradit et al., (2012), find a negative relationship between corporate performance and CEO 
turnover, though they used accounting measure of performance rather than market-based 
performance because of its inherent drawbacks such as discount in stock price and illiquidity of 
the stock market especially in the developing markets. Furthermore, accounting-based 
performance such as return on assets (ROA) supplements market- based performance by 
revealing more information about the management’s actions than what Tobin’s Q alone do and 
market-based performance measures in developing economies tend to rise and fall together, and 
this positive synchronization is functionally inefficient (Conyon & He, 2012). Thus, the study 
hypothesises that:  
 
H1:  Firms are more likely to replace their CEOs in the event of poor performance. 
 
2.3 Board Size and CEO Turnover 
 
In addition to firm performance, Fredrickson et al., (1988) suggested that board attributes 
influence CEO turnover. Board size is an aspect of the board of directors’ attributes that is likely 
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to affect rational dynamics between group members and their ability to process information 
effectively. The size of the board is considered as a yardstick to determine the effectiveness of 
the board in monitoring the CEO (Chemmanur & Fedaseyeu, 2015). There are conflicting findings 
from the previous studies that have investigated the relationship between board size and CEO 
turnover; there are mostly conflicting, mixed and inconclusive. For instance, Chemmanur and 
Fedaseyeu (2015) argue that having a large number of board members increase the amount of 
information that is potentially available to the board and the larger board may also help firms gain 
access to resources. This implied that the board would be better equipped with the necessary 
information and capability to monitor the CEOs and effectively make an informed decision on 
CEO turnover, hence more likely to replace the CEO when the performance declines. 
On the other side, Rachpradit et al.,(2012) find that the probability of CEO turnover is low 
when the board size is large for a sample of Thai companies. Moreover, large board size has an 
adverse effect on the quality of monitoring of the board; the smaller boards are more likely to 
replace poorly performing CEOs (Bekiris, 2013; Cook, 2015b; Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2012b). 
Thus, this study hypothesises that: 
 
H2:  Firms with larger board size are not likely to replace their CEOs. 
 
2.4  Board Composition and CEO Turnover 
 
When the board is correctly composed of both outsider and insider directors in the right proportion, 
it impacts on the effectiveness and capabilities of the board in the discharge of its monitoring 
roles. A key way to strengthen the monitoring capacity of the board effectively is to have a 
reasonable number of independent (non-executive) directors on the board (Guo & Masulis, 2015). 
This is necessary to curtail the influence of CEOs on the board. Because CEO’s presence on the 
board affects the board composition and it leads to reciprocal CEO interlock which enhances 
CEO’s private interests and ultimately weakens the corporate governance (Pombo & Gutiérrez, 
2011). In a related study, Dimopoulos and Wagner (2012) noted that board independence is likely 
to be the key ingredients to board in removing underperforming CEO. Similarly, Firth, Fung and 
Rui (2007) find that turnover performance sensitivity is higher with a larger proportion of non-
executive directors on the board. In fact, a higher level of board independence increases the 
chance of CEO turnover in the event of poor firm performance. Thus, this study postulates that:  
 
H3:  Firms with a higher number of outside directors on the board are more likely to replace their 
CEOs.  
 
2.5 Board Nominating Committee and CEO Turnover 
 
Most corporate boards execute their tasks through committees created by the board of directors. 
It makes the board more effective and efficient in discharging its responsibilities. Because of the 
increase in the recent board activities, size and the complexities of organisation most boards 
perform their functions through committees and one of the most vital of such committees is 
nominating committee (Schloetzer, Tonello, Matteo & Larkin, 2017). The nominating committee 
is one of such cardinal board committees that guarantees good corporate governance (Ogbechie, 
2012). It is saddled with the responsibilities to hire and fire directors and CEOs for the companies. 
Hence, the role of the nominating committee, as well as its composition, is crucial in determining 
the future direction of the firm. However, given this apparent importance of this board committee, 
very little attention has been paid to this important committee by the researchers of corporate 
governance in the emerging markets. Hence, this study fills the gap in the empirical studies on 
the developing markets with particular reference to Nigeria.  
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Furthermore, Guo and Masulis (2015) argue that the forced CEO turnover’s sensitivity to firm 
performance increases as the nominating committee becomes more independent. They stress 
that board nominating committee is very important in determining the effectiveness and quality of 
the CEO monitoring and supervision. The independence of the board of directors and the 
nominating committee have different rules, but their effects on the board monitoring are 
complementary, especially the forced CEO turnover’s sensitivity to firm performance increases 
as the nominating committee becomes more independent. The study hypothesises that: 
 
H4:  Firms with a high number of outsiders on the board nominating committee are more likely to 
change their CEOs. 
 
2.6 Board Gender 
 
In line with agency theory, the monitoring role of the board of directors serves as an extremely 
important mechanism for mitigating the conflicts between the principal and the agent, which 
ultimately affect corporate performance. Recent studies have also suggested that greater 
boardroom gender diversity can strengthen the monitoring function of the board. For instance, 
Nguyen et al. (2014) observed that female directors appear to have superior monitoring ability 
and are also able to think more independently, and they are not influenced by the usual old-boys' 
club syndrome common with the men. Furthermore, greater board gender diversity can also 
improve better monitoring because female director representation enhances managerial 
accountability and CEO responsibility. Resource dependence theory opines that the security of 
companies' crucial resources and the linkage between the firms and its external environment 
could be enhanced by increasing the diversity and size of the board. Impliedly, firms with more 
diverse boards can have advantages in acquiring and maintaining their vital resources 
Female directors’ presence on the board of directors of firms no doubt plays a key role in the 
effective performance of the board, especially as it relates to the monitoring and advisory roles of 
the board towards the management. As such, it is expected to influence the CEO succession of 
the firm. Alves et al., (2015) in their findings provide evidence that a more gender diversified board 
of directors enhances the board’s independence and efficiency. As a result of the enhanced 
performance, efficient and effective monitoring of the firm by the board, as argued by Alves et al., 
(2015) the firms’ performance increases and this, in turn, reduces the probability of CEO turnover. 
Hence, the study hypothesises that: 
 
H5:  Firms with female board members are less likely to replace their CEOs 
 
2.7 Board Religiosity and CEO Turnover 
 
Several studies have examined how corporate decision making is affected by the religiosity of the 
individual director or decision maker (Grullon, Kanatas, & Weston, 2009). In the same vein, 
researchers have argued that high religiosity among the corporate directors influence the 
management of corporations to strive to attain the wealth creation and maximisation for the 
shareholders (El-Bassiouny, Darrag, Seoudi, & Zahran, 2015). Although some studies have 
examined effects of religions on corporate governance and firm performance, none to the best of 
the researchers’ knowledge has examined the influence of board member religiosity on the CEO 
turnover. Moreover, with the diversity in the world population, the rapid globalisation and the 
profound influence of religion on the human behaviour, there is need to investigate the influence 
of religion on the corporate boards especially as it affects their responsibility of monitoring and 
disciplining the CEOs and other succession decisions. This is in line with the view of Kim and 
Daniel (2016) that corporate persons like shareholder and board of directors are more likely to 
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have more active and greater monitoring of the management because of high board accountability 
as a result of the board religiosity.  
Furthermore, Nigeria is a predominantly Muslim country with over 60% of its population 
Muslims. Hence, the primary religion of Nigeria can be unequivocally said to be Islam, this is 
consistent with the position of Stulz and Williamson (2003) as cited by Kim and Daniel (2016) 
defining a primary religion of a state as the religion practiced by the largest segment of the nation’s 
population and posit that the corporate governance of a country is affected by the dominant 
religion in that country. Therefore, it is expected that the high ethical standard and moral 
accountability which is the hallmark of Islamic teachings (Abuznaid, 2009), will influence the 
behaviour of the board members who are Muslims and such board will be more effective in 
monitoring the CEOs and consequently are more likely to dismiss the underperforming CEOs. 
Hence, this study postulates that:  
 
H6:  Firms with a higher number of Muslim directors on the board are more likely to replace their 
CEOs 
 
2.8 Control Variables  
 
Firm size has been variously established by the previous studies to influence positively on the 
CEO turnover. It is mostly measured as the log of total assets (Yoo & Reed, 2015). Others like 
Bates et al.,(2015) view firm size as the natural log of the total book value of assets. Similarly, 
Yun Liu (2010) controlled for company size in his study of the impact of the network on CEO 
turnover, appointments and compensation and established that large firms are more likely to 
change their CEOs more frequently than the smaller firms. Therefore, this study envisages that 
firm size will have a positive relationship with the CEO turnover, that is, the bigger the size of the 
firm, the higher the likelihood or the probability of the firms to change their CEOs. 
Prior researchers have claimed that the greater the leverage, the higher the agency cost and 
the greater the demand for monitoring of the CEO. The leverage is measured as the ratio of long-
term debt to total assets. Other researchers establish a positive relationship between firm 
leverage and CEO turnover. The higher the ratio of debt to equity (leverage) the higher the 
probability of CEO turnover (Lindrianasari & Hartono, 2012). CEO turnover is more likely to occur 
in firms within a competitive industry. This is so because of the homogeneous nature of the firms 
in the industry and the availability of a considerable number of suitable candidates from the 
outside of the firm (Fatima et al., 2014; Ishak & Latif, 2012; Ishak & Latif, 2013; Lindrianasari & 
Hartono, 2012). Yoo and Reed (2015) control for the effect of firm age because of the impact of 
maturity and development of firms on the decisions of the firm, and this comes with age. Older 
firms are believed to have a very organized and formal structure of decision making, and they rely 
on the established routine of decision making because of their long existence. As a result, the 




The methodology used in this study is based on secondary data and is panel data mainly sourced 
from the audited annual reports of the public listed companies in Nigeria and corporate 
announcements from the website of the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). The study is to 
determine the influence of board structure and firm performance on the CEO turnover. The study 
covers all the non- financial public listed companies in Nigeria within the period of 2011 to 2015, 
focusing on those companies that have changed their CEOs within the period. Therefore, the 
individual company is the unit of analysis in this study, which consists of all the public listed 
companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). 
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3.1  Research Framework 
 
In line with the theoretical foundation and the literature reviewed in the preceding section, 
research framework was developed to investigate further the possible factors that determine CEO 
turnover. The independent variables of this research are firm performance, board size, board 
composition, board nominating committee, board gender and board religiosity with CEO turnover 
as the dependent variable. This research framework is consistent with the suggestion of 




Figure 1. Research Framework  
 
3.2  Population and Sample Selection 
 
Nigerian stock exchange classified the listed companies into financial services sector and non- 
financial sector. This study uses a sample of non-financial companies of the Nigerian public listed 
companies. It is comprised of ten sectors with a total of 128 companies as presented in Table 1. 
The sectors are; Agriculture, Conglomerates, Construction/ Real Estate, Consumer Goods, 
Healthcare, Information and Communication Technology, Industrial Goods, Natural Resources, 
Oil and Gas, and Services. Meanwhile, due to lack of complete data and non-availability of data 
for some of the companies, the total population dropped to 103 companies which stands as the 
sample size for the study. Overall, there are 72 CEO turnovers in the non- financial sector of the 
public listed companies on the NSE between 2011 to 2015, as shown in Table 1. Thus, the 72 
CEO turnover companies matched with another 72 non-turnover companies making a total of 144 
formed the final sample size for this study. 
 
Table 1. Non- financial Sector of the NSE 
S/N Sector Number Turnover 
1 Agriculture 5 2 
2 Conglomerates 6 5 
3 Construction/Real Estate 10 5 
4 Consumer Goods 28 22 
5 Healthcare 10 6 
6 Information and Communication Technology 10 0 
7 Industrial Goods 24 16 
8 Natural Resources 5 3 
9 Oil and Gas 10 9 
10 Services 20 4 
 Total 128 72 
 
• FIRM PERFORMANCE 
• BOARD SIZE 
• BOARD COMPOSITION 
• BOARD NOMINATING COMMITTEE 
• BOARD GENDER 




• FIRM SIZE 
• FIRM DIVERSITY 
• LEVERAGE 
• FIRM AGE 
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A matching methodology was adopted to match the 72 turnover companies with 72 non-turnover 
companies to estimate the regression model for the CEO turnover. Pallant (2007) observed that 
logistic regression is an analytical tool used in simultaneously investigating the effects of several 
independent variables on single dependent variables. This is an appropriate statistical technique 
when the dependent variable is nominal (Ishak, 2010). 
However, due to the peculiarities of the sample of this study, matching companies were 
selected based on asset size using 50 percent upper and lower limit, which is consistent with 
previous researchers like (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, & Lafond, 2006) and Ishak (2010). It was 
not possible to select the matching companies based on the industry because some of the 
industries had a turnover in virtually all the companies, for example, Oil and Gas, Consumer 
Goods and Conglomerates. As such, no company or very few companies were left in the category 
of non-turnover companies for the particular industry. Based on the discussion in the preceding 




CEOTURNOVER =  β0 + β1PERFMit + β2BSIZEit + β3BCOMPit + β4BGNDRit + β5BNCMit + β6BRLGNit  
   + β7FSIZEit + β8DVRSTYit + β9LEVRGEit + β10FAGEit + ɛit 
 
Where: 
CEOTURNOVER   CEO turnover 
PERFM     Return on assets and Tobin’s Q 
BSIZE     Board size 
BCOMP     Board composition 
BNCM     Board nominating committee 
BGNDR     Board member gender 
BRLGN     Board member religiosity 
FSIZE     Firm size 
LEVRGE    Leverage 
DVRSTY    Firm diversity 
FAGE     Firm age 
 
3.3 Measurement of the Independent Variables 
 
The basic objective of this study is to examine the influence of firm performance and board 
structure on CEO turnover. Firm performance is represented by two main measures; these are 
ROA and Tobin’s Q. Board structure is represented by the attributes of board size, board 
composition, board nominating committee, board gender and religiosity of board members. There 
are also four control variables used in this research, and they include firm size, leverage, firm 
diversity and firm age. 
 
Table 2. Measurement of Research Variables and Main Sources of Data 




Dependent Variables  
CEO Succession  
1. CEO Turnover CEOTURNOVER Dummies:  
1 = Turnover  




2. CEO Selection CEOSELECTION Dummies:  
1 = Outsider the company  
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Firm Performance   
3.  Performance PERFM Proxied as profit before interest & 




Ishak et al., (2012) 
   equity + debt capital/Book value of the 




Board Structure  
4. Board Size  BSIZE Total number of board members  Annual 
Reports  




BCOMP Proportion non-executive members in 







BNCM The proportion of non-executive 
members in the nominating committee  
Annual 
Reports 
(Guo & Masulis, 
2015; 
 Ishak, 2010). 












(Ali & Azmi, 2016) 
Control Variables  
Firm Characteristics  
10. Firm Size  FSIZE Log of the book value of total assets  Data 
Stream 
Ishak et al., (2012) 




Ishak et al., (2012) 




13.  Firm Age FAGE Natural logarithm for the years of 





4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Various kinds of univariate tests were carried out on the data. Continuous measures like mean, 
median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation were analysed to highlight the features and 
characteristics of the sample. Also, the difference in means for the turnover and matching 
companies (no turnover) sample was conducted using match paired t-test for the assumption of 
normal distribution, while Wilcoxon signed-rank test was conducted to test the sensitivity of the 
results for the non-parametric which does not require the assumption of normality. 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics; seven independent variables were considered in this 
study. Two alternative proxies were used for firm performance, ROA for accounting-based 
performance and Tobin’s Q for the market-based performance. The mean for the ROA for the full 
sample is 0.027, and that of matching companies is 0.049, both are higher than that of turnover 
firms which is very low at 0.004. However, there is no significant difference between the medians 
of all the categories. The mean of Tobin’s Q for the turnover firms is 2.230 which is 21% and 41% 
higher than mean for the full sample and the matching firms respectively.  
Mean of board size for all the categories of firms is nine members on board. The maximum 
number of members is seventeen while the minimum number of members on board is four. This 
result is consistent with the finding of Sanda et al., (2010) that reported optimal board size of ten 
and similar to that of Malaysian firms of eight reported by Ishak (2010). There is no marked 
difference between the percentages of the non-executive directors on board for all the categories 
of firms. For the full sample the percentage is 73%, the turnover sample the percentage is 72% 
while for the matching sample it is 74%. This finding indicates that more than half of the board 
members for all samples are made up of non-executive directors and that the firms in Nigeria 
Abdullahi, Y.U, Ishak, R., and Sawandi, N. 
13 
complied with the regulation of the SEC codes that requires that one-third of the board members 
should be comprised of outside directors.  
Meanwhile, board nominating committee has the mean of 59% for the full sample and 67% 
and 51% for the turnover and no turnover firms respectively. This result connotes that majority of 
the members of the nominating committee is composed of non-executive directors. While the 
mean of board members gender is 10.8% for the full sample, while the turnover companies are 
8.3% and the matching firms is a bit higher at 13.4%. Overall, this result reveals a low 
representation of female directors on the board; in fact, some firms do not even have any female 
on their boards as the minimum score is zero percent indicating no female director on the board. 
Similarly, the mean of board member religiosity is 20.2% for the turnover sample, 21.3% for the 
full sample while that of the matching firms is 22.4%. This result shows that the proportion of 
Muslim directors on the corporate boards of Nigerian listed public companies is deficient and there 
are some firms that do not even have any Muslim on the board as the minimum score indicated 
zero.  
The mean for the firm size is higher in turnover firms than the comparable companies; this 
implies that majority of the turnover firms are large size companies. Similarly, the ratio of total 
debt to total asset the mean is 80% for a turnover sample while that of the matching sample is 
lower at 58% and 69% for the full sample. The result indicates that the firms are more likely to 
change their CEOs when the firm’s debt burden and obligation are high. There is no difference in 
firm age for all categories of the sample as the mean age of the firms is 40 years. 
A comparison between the turnover sample and matching sample using both paired t-test 
and Wilcoxon signed-rank test revealed that only accounting based performance (ROA) has a 
significant difference as the p-value of the mean is significant at 1%. Furthermore, comparing the 
medians of the two measures of performance; Return on asset and Tobin’s Q, the Wilcoxon test 
indicated a significant difference at 10% and 5% respectively. As for board structure variables, 
there is no significant difference in board size, board composition and board member religiosity 
for both turnover and matching firms. The board nominating committee showed a significant 
difference for the Wilcoxon test at 1% level of significance. Similarly, board member gender 
displayed a significant difference as both the paired t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test are 
significant at 1% and 5% level respectively. 
The next section discusses reports of the correlation analysis, test for multicollinearity and 
logistic regression analysis. 
 
4.1 Correlation Analysis 
 
Pearson product-moment correlation was adopted in this study to investigate the relationship 
between the variables; this is consistent with the suggestions of Pallant (2007). Thus, Table 4 
displays the reports of the correlation between all the variables contained in this study. In line with 
the guidelines on interpretation by Pallant (2007), which suggests that correlation above +_0.50 
was strong, +_0.30 to +_0.49 means a reasonable relation and +_0.10 to +0.29 indicate a weak 
relationship. As displayed in Table 4, all the correlation coefficients are within the threshold as 
such there is no multicollinearity issue among the variables of this study. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables 
Full sample (N= 144 Companies) 
CEO Turnover Companies 
(N=72) 
 
Matching Companies (N =72) 
 
CEO Turnover vs Matched Companies 
Paired t-test Wilcoxon signed rank test 




Dev t-test p-value z-test p-value 
ROA 0.027 0.038 -0.933 0.388 0.127 0.004 0.035 0.151 0.049 0.041 0.094 2.162 0.016** 1.648 0.099* 
TOBINSQ 1.769 1.076 0.022 47.953 4.075 2.230 1.156 5.638 1.307 0.990 1.110 -1.362 0.912 -2.122 0.034** 
BSIZE 8.701 9.000 4.000 17.000 2.421 8.778 9.000 2.369 8.625 8.000 2.486 -0.378 0.647 -0.540 0.589 
BCOMP 0.733 0.789 0.125 0.933 0.174 0.724 0.800 0.200 0.741 0.778 0.144 0.596 0.276 -0.308 0.758 
BNCM 0.591 0.708 0 1 0.409 0.669 0.75 0.398 0.513 0.667 0.408 -2.321 0.989 -2.586 0.010*** 
BGNDR 0.108 0.100 0.000 0.800 0.131 0.083 0.038 0.100 0.134 0.111 0.153 -2.361 0.010*** 2.262 0.024** 
BRLGN 0.213 0.167 0.000 0.800 0.192 0.202 0.143 0.190 0.224 0.174 0.195 0.693 0.245 1.096 0.273 
FSIZE (million) 49.100 11.400 0.094 1,110 123 70.1 3.700 164 28.100 8.803 50.700 -2.072 0.980 -1.594 0.111 
LFSIZE 16..297 16.246 11.450 20.828 1.754 16.537 16.429 1.881 16.057 15.991 1.594 -1.652 0.950 -1.594 0.111 
LEVRGE 0.688 0.573 0.022 13.451 1.103 0.797 0.609 1.533 0.580 0.542 0.275 -1.181 0.880 -1.520 0.128 
FAGE 39.903 42.000 3.000 91.000 19.837 40.208 42.500 18.826 39.597 38.500 20.926 -0.184 0.573 -0.330 0.742 
*** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level *Significant at 10% level. ROA = Return on Asset, TOBINSQ = Tobin’s Q, BSIZE = Board size, BCOMP = Board composition, BNCM 
= Board nominating committee, BGNDR = Board member’s Gender, BRLGN = Board member’s Religiosity, FSIZE = Firm size, LFSIZE = Log of firm size, LEVRGE = Firm leverage, 
FAGE = Firm age. 
 
 
Table 4. Correlation Matrix 
Variables TURNOVER ROA TOBINSQ BSIZE BCOMP BNCM BGNDR BRLGN LFSIZE DVRSTY LEVRGE FAGE 
CEOTURNOVER 1.000 
    
 
      
ROA -0.179* 1.000 
   
 
      
TOBINSQ 0.114 -0.553*** 1.000 
  
 
      
BSIZE 0.032 0.000 -0.028 1.000 
 
 
      
BCOMP -0.050 -0.039 -0.086 0.054 1.000  
      
BNCM 0.191* 0.135 -0.097 0.199* 0.073 1.000       
BGNDR -0.194** 0.117 -0.066 0.119 -0.033 0.144* 1.000 
     
BRLGN -0.058 0.103 -0.147* 0.070 0.105 0.207* 0.229*** 1.000 
    
LFSIZE 0.137 0.247*** -0.200** 0.400*** -0.298*** 0.290* 0.124 0.253*** 1.000 
   
DVRSTY 0.139* 0.102 -0.042 -0.039 -0.186** 0.297* 0.029 -0.104 0.307*** 1.000 
  
LEVRGE 0.099 -0.668*** 0.934*** -0.027 -0.047 -0.105 -0.092 -0.092 -0.224*** -0.051 1.000 
 
FAGE 0.016 0.125 -0.028 -0.028 0.080 0.174* 0.041 -0.024 0.074 0.089 -0.017 1.000 
NOTE: ***, ** and * indicate that the parameter estimate was significant at level 1%, 5% and 10% respect 
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4.2 Multicollinearity Test 
 
Collinearity diagnostic test was conducted to determine the existence of intercorrelation 
between the independent variables. Multicollinearity is deemed to exist if the tolerance 
level is less than 0.01 and the variance inflation factor is higher than 10 (Pallant, 2007). 
Table 5 shows that there is no multicollinearity existing among the variables in this study, 
as all the tolerance values are respectively greater than 0.01 and VIF less than 10.  
 
Table 5. Multicollinearity Test: Tolerance Value and VIF 
Variables Collinearity Statistics Tolerance Value Variance Inflation Factor 
ROA 0.520 1.920 
TOBINSQ 0.118 8.450 
BSIZE 0.733 1.360 
BCOMP 0.796 1.260 
BNCM 0.771 1.30 
BGNDR 0.905 1.100 
BRLGN 0.791 1.260 
BHOWN 0.702 1.430 
FROWN 0.593 1.690 
MGOWN 0.797 1.260 
CEOPWR 0.799 1.250 
LFSIZE 0.495 2.020 
LEVRGE 0.513 1.950 
DVRSTY 0.797 1.250 
FAGE 0.747 1.340 
 
4.3  Firm Performance and CEO turnover 
 
The result from the finding as indicated in Table 6 shows that firm performance proxied by 
ROA is negatively associated with CEO turnover at 5% level of significance. This finding 
implies that firm performance is typically used as a yardstick to measure the quality and 
success of the management. Hence, deficient performance causes CEO turnover. Thus, 
dismissal of the CEO by the board is in line with the assumption of agency theory which 
suggests that threat of dismissal makes the CEOs to align their interests with those of the 
shareholders.  
 This finding agrees with the previous researchers like Dikolli, Mayew, and Nanda 
(2014); Lindrianasari and Hartono (2012); Ishak ( 2010) and Conyon and He (2014) which 
revealed that the likelihood of CEO turnover increases as the firm performance declines 
or decreases. Furthermore, the study revealed that accounting-based performance (ROA) 
is significant compared to market-based (Tobin’s Q) as displayed in Table 1.7. This is 
supported by the previous empirical findings by Cook (2015); Choi (2015); Ishak, Ku Ismail 
and Abdullah (2013) which reported negative relationship between firm performance and 
CEO turnover using accounting measure of performance rather than market-based 
performance because of its demerits, such as, discount in stock price and illiquidity of 
stock market especially the developing markets like Nigeria. Also, accounting-based 
performance reveals more information about the management’s actions than Tobin’s Q. 
Therefore, the finding of this study supported the hypothesis that firms are more likely to 
change their CEOs in the event of poor performance. 
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Table 6. Logistic Regression Model 
CEO Turnover="1" Predicted sign Coefficient Standard Errors Z Statistic p- value 
ROA - -4.651 2.202 -2.11 0.035** 
BSIZE - -0.044 .0877 -0.50 0.620 
BCOMP + -0.088 1.150 -0.08 0.939 
BNCM  1.150 .504 2.28 0.023** 
BGNDR - -4.261 1.847 -2.31 0.021** 
BRLGN + -0.938 1.082 -0.87 0.386 
LFSIZE 
 
0.250 .144 1.74 0.082* 
LEVRGE 
 
0.223 .418 0.53 0.594 
DVRSTY 
 
0.029 .432 0.07 0.947 
FAGE 
 
-0.001 .010 -0.08 0.939 
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level. 
 
Below is the result of the regression for the market-based performance (Tobin’s Q, the 
alternate proxy for the firm performance). 
 
Table 7. Logistic Regression (with Tobin’s Q) 
CEO Turnover="1" Predicted sign Coefficient Standard Errors Z Statistic p-value 
TOBINSQ - 0.149 0.159 0.93 0.350 
BSIZE - -0.033 0.087 -0.39 0.699 
BCOMP + 0.123 1.147 0.11 0.914 
BNCM  1.073 0.501 2.14 0.032** 
BGNDR - -4.370 1.794 -2.44 0.015** 
BRLGN + -0.867 1.078 -0.80 0.421 
LFSIZE 
 
0.211 0.141 1.49 0.136 
LEVRGE 
 
0.175 0.411 0.43 0.670 
DVRSTY 
 
0.287 0.706 0.41 0.684 
FAGE 
 
-0.004 0.010 -0.43 0.670 
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level. 
 
4.4  Board Size 
 
The study hypothesised that firms with larger board size are less likely to replace their 
CEOs. Although the coefficient of board size is negative, it is not significant. Hence, larger 
board size is not important in determining CEO turnover. This finding is consistent with the 
argument of Cook (2015) and Bekiris (2013) that smaller board size enhances the ability 
of the board to monitor the CEO, hence, more likely to change the CEO. Furthermore, the 
negative and insignificant coefficient could be because the Nigerian corporate landscape 
is characterised by mostly large board size as the mean of board size as presented in 
Table 3 is nine, and the maximum board size is 17. This is like optimal board size of eight 
in the Malaysian corporate structure as reported by Ishak (2010). 
 
4.5  Board Composition 
 
Hypothesis on board composition to turnover predicts a significant positive relationship 
between the proportion of outside directors on board and CEO turnover. Prior empirical 
findings like Dimopoulos and Wagner (2012) and; Zahra and Pearce (1989) reported that 
companies with a higher proportion of outsiders on the board have a higher probability of 
CEO turnover than companies with the insider-dominated board. They argued that, 
outside directors’ diversity, breadth and expertise enable them to offer more effective 
monitoring of CEOs’ activities, thus, more likely to dismiss the underperforming CEOs.  
 However, this study failed to find a significant relationship between board composition 
and the likelihood of CEO turnover, although the coefficient as shown in Table 6 is positive. 
Therefore, this indicates that higher proportion of non-executive (outside director) onboard 
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does not play a key role in the dismissal of a poorly performing CEO. Although, the finding 
does not support the hypothesis; but, it is consistent with that of Rachpradit et al. (2012) 
and Hsu and Wu (2014) that sensitivity of CEO turnover is higher with board with less 
outside directors, this is due to the problem of free riders associated with an outsider 
dominated boards. 
 
4.6  Board Members’ Gender 
 
The result of the regression shows that board members’ gender is significant at 5% level 
with a negative coefficient, indicating that the more female directors on the board of a firm 
the less the probability of CEO turnover. This finding supported the hypothesis which 
stated that firms with a high proportion of female board members are less likely to change 
their CEOs. The result of this study is consistent with the previous empirical findings 
reported by researchers like Alves et al. (2015) that gender diversity enhances the 
effectiveness of the board of directors and add values to the company. It equally improves 
the performance of the firm (Ku Ismail & Abdul-Manaf, 2016), which in turn reduces the 
probability of dismissing the CEO, because there will be no need for a turnover as the 
firm’s performance is excellent. 
 
4.7 Board Nominating Committee 
 
The study postulates that firms with more outside directors in the nominating committee 
are more likely to change their CEOs. The result as displayed in Table 6 shows that board 
nominating committee is significant at 5% level with a positive coefficient and p-value of 
0.023, which implies that, the more the number of outside directors in the nominating 
committee, the higher the probability of CEO turnover. This finding supported the 
hypothesis, and it is consistent with the arguments of other scholars like Guo and Masulis 
(2015) who argue that board nominating committee is very important in determining the 
effectiveness and quality of the CEO monitoring which leads to high CEO turnover.  
 
4.8  Board Member Religiosity 
 
The hypothesis predicts a positive and significant relationship between the proportion of 
the Muslims on the board of directors of the company and CEO turnover. From the result 
of the study as displayed in Table 6 it is not statistically significant, and as such, the 
hypothesis was not supported. Therefore, board religiosity does not play a significant role 
in the decision to change or replace the CEO. This is contrary to the findings of previous 
empirical studies by Volonte (2015) and Kim and Daniel (2016) that corporate persons like 
shareholder and board of directors are more likely to have more effective and greater 
monitoring of the management because of high board accountability as a result of the 
board religiosity.  
The result does not support the hypothesis, and this is surprising. However, a 
probable reason might be likened to the result of the descriptive statistics in Table 3 where 
the mean score of Muslim proportion on the board is 20 percent, when compares to the 
population of the non-Muslims 80%. This situation is considered too small and does not 
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4.9  Control Variables 
 
There are four control variables in this study namely; firm size, diversity, leverage and firm 
age. The study expects all the control variables to have a positive coefficient, meaning the 
larger the firm size, the more the leverage, the more business segments a firm has and 
the older the firm, the higher the likelihood of CEO turnover. The result as displayed in 
Table 6 reveals that the larger firms are more likely to replace their CEOs, the remaining 
variables though not significant, all have positive coefficient excepts firm age which shows 
a negative coefficient. 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
This study focuses on factors that influence CEO turnover in public listed companies in 
Nigeria. This is the first study to consider the influence of board nominating committee and 
board gender diversity on CEO turnover in the developing markets. The study finds that 
firm performance measured by ROA is mostly used as a yardstick by the shareholders to 
assess the management which in turn determines the bases for dismissal of the CEO as 
the performance declines. The study also reveals that presence of females on the board 
enhances the performance of the board and thereby reduces the probability of CEO 
turnover. Similarly, when there is a well composed nominating committee of the board, the 
probability of replacing a non-performing CEO is higher. 
In line with the above submission, this study suggests that the government should 
enact legislation on gender quota so that more women should be appointed to the board 
of the corporation to better the performance of the firm and as well enhance the monitoring 
role of the board. It also suggests that the firms should adhere to good corporate practices 
to enhance the well-being of the companies and safeguard the interest of the 
shareholders. Furthermore, the regulators should step up their monitoring of the firms to 
ensure compliance and enforcement of the code of corporate governance issued by the 
authority. Finally, it is hoped that this study will evoke more research in this area especially 
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